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The basis of valuations for secured commercial property lending in the UK 
Abstract 
In the context of the financial crash and the commercial property market downturn, 
this paper examines the basis of valuation used in the UK commercial property 
lending process.   
Post-crisis there is discussion of countercyclical measures including the monitoring of 
asset prices; however there is no consideration of a different approach to property 
valuation.  This paper questions this omission, given the role that valuations play in 
the bank regulatory process.  The different bases of valuation available to lenders 
within International Valuation Standards are identified as Market Value (MV), 
Mortgage Lending Value (MLV) and Investment Value (IV), with MV being the 
most used in the UK.  Using the different bases in the period before the financial 
crisis, the UK property market is modelled at a national office, retail and 
industrial/warehouse sector level to determine the performance of each alternative 
valuation basis within the context of counter-cyclical pressures on lending.  Both 
MLV and IV would have produced lower valuations and could have provided lenders 
with tools for more informed and prudent lending.  The paper concludes by 
recognising some of the practical issues involved in adopting the different bases for 
the bank lending role but recommends a change to IV. 
  
Keywords: Commercial property valuation, secured lending, Mortgage lending 
Value, Market Value, Investment Value 
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1. Introduction  
In January 2011, the chair of the UK Independent Commission on Banking reported 
progress with his committee‘s review of the UK banking system.  In scoping the 
problem he placed real estate at its heart. 
“The shock from the fall in property prices, even from their inflated levels of a 
few years ago, should not have caused havoc on anything like the scale 
experienced. Rather than suffering a „perfect storm‟, we had severe weather 
that exposed a damagingly rickety structure”.  (Vickers, 2011, p2) 
This is the only time that real estate or property is mentioned in the main text1; 
although property is identified as central to the financial crisis, reviewing the 
approach to real estate in secured lending is not seen as part of the solution.  In this 
paper we consider whether reconsidering the basis of valuation of real estate can 
prevent future ‗havoc‘.  
Real estate plays an important, and well documented, role in bank lending.  Goodhart 
(2010) notes that real estate is the most common form of collateral for lending 
(whatever the purpose of the loan).  Internationally, the Bank of England estimate that 
one-third of lending by UK banks world-wide is to the commercial real estate sector 
(BoE, 2010).   
                                                 
1 Property is referred to in one footnote as to the reason why retail banks are also ―risky‖ – again part 
of the problem. 
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Also well documented are the problems now being faced as a result of these loans.  In 
December 2010, the Bank of England reported that a significant number of 
commercial real estate loans in the UK were in negative equity (BoE, 2010).  Maxted 
and Porter (2011, p 23) found that in mid-year 2010, 16% of loans in the UK 
commercial property market were in breach of financial covenants; these loans are 
estimated to be worth around £34 Billion. 46% of these were in breach because of the 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) covenant.  Before the crisis the maximum number of loans in 
technical breach was less than 2.5% and often less than 1% (Maxted and Porter, 
2011). 
There were warnings sounded prior to the downturn.  In 2007 the Bank of England 
highlighted the vulnerability of financial markets caused by the increased ease of 
borrowing and the associated asset price growth in commercial property markets 
(BoE, 2007).   There is also an established literature which identifies the role of 
financial liberalisation and credit expansion in causing bubbles in asset prices (see 
Allen and Gale, 1999 and 2000).  The same literature also describes the inevitability 
of the bubble bursting with consequential collapse of stock and real estate markets.  
It is within this context of asset price bubbles and crashes that this paper examines the 
role of valuations in the commercial property lending process, specifically focusing 
on the basis of valuation.  The aim of the initial part of the paper is to understand 
some of the influences and pressures which cause bubbles in the first place and 
potentially impact on valuations, to establish the bases of valuation used in bank 
lending and the extent to which there is any discussion of revision to the basis of 
valuation in future crisis prevention.  
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This is followed by a case study of the UK commercial property market to examine 
the indicative level of valuations produced by the different possible bases in the pre- 
and post-financial crisis period.  The discussion of the results focuses on the 
effectiveness of each of these bases for the bank lending role, including the 
practicalities of adopting each model.  The paper then makes recommendations on the 
role that a different approach to property valuations could play in helping to achieve 
the first aim of the UK‘s Independent Commission: ―to reduce the probability and 
impact of systemic financial crises in the future ― (Vickers, 2011, p 2) 
2. The behavioural context 
While standard neo-classical theory might suggest that asset price bubbles do not 
exist,  even the proponents of the efficient market theory agree that the behaviour of 
market participants can affect markets.   Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003, p173) draw 
on the behavioural finance literature to contend that market bubbles survive due to the 
behaviour of actors subject to ―animal spirits, fads and fashions, overconfidence, 
trend chasing and related psychological biases that might lead to momentum trading, 
trend chasing and the like.‖  This leads to market participants, despite understanding 
that markets will eventually collapse, riding the bubble and generating high returns 
with the goal of exiting just before the crash.  Alongside this, McAllister et al (2008) 
document the pressures on fund managers to ‗place money‘ in the heated UK 
commercial real estate investment market of 2005/6.    
Under the efficient market hypothesis, well informed arbitrageurs will act to correct 
any actual or even potential mispricing (Fama, 1965).   However, there is a significant 
literature on the limits to arbitrage.  For example, Brunnermeier (2001) and Shleifer 
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and Vishny (1997) identify principal-agent problems, including the constraints of 
using bank finance by traders, to limit the ability of traders to exploit arbitrage 
possibilities which can have ―a profound impact on asset‘s price process‖ 
(Brunnermeier, 2001, p205).   
Allen and Gale (1999) suggest that risk shifting further enhances the ability of 
bubbles to survive longer than neo-classical theory suggests they should.  The use of 
debt and the limited liability of both investors and fund managers, encourages them to 
take risks as they share in the returns but do not take an equal share in the losses.  
They may suffer reputational damage but Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that 
the incentives and rewards outweigh reputational risk.   Likewise, the study of the 
commercial real estate investment market by Graff and Webb concluded that buyers 
rewarded with outcome-based fee structures led to ―frenzied acquisitions and 
overbidding‖ in a market where demand exceeded supply (1997:30). 
This literature all points towards behaviour that is very pro-cyclical and to the need 
for counter-cyclical measures; the next section considers the options and the extent to 
which these include the basis of valuation. 
3. Crisis prevention and valuations 
Countercyclical measures are the focus of attention post-crisis, not least by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
which provides the global regulatory framework for banking. These measures are 
centred on the minimum capital requirements for lenders which are currently set out 
in Basel 2 (BIS 2005).   Through these requirements, Basel 2 aimed to manage the 
risks taken by lenders and so protect the customers‘ funds with which banks lend, as 
7 
 
well as maintaining the viability and resilience of the banking sector to economic 
shocks.  This framework was implemented by the EU in 2007 via two main directives 
which together are known as the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD (EU 2006a 
and 2006b). In turn, this is implemented in the UK by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) under its wide statutory powers of rule-making.   
However, post crisis BIS is strengthening regulation through Basel 3 largely to try 
and reduce the systemic risks associated with procyclicality.  As part of this 
strengthening, a countercyclical buffer is to be introduced which will require national 
authorities to monitor key indicators of system-wide risk, particularly the credit/GDP 
guide and mean that banks must hold additional capital where there is a build-up of 
such risk.  However, while authorities are encouraged to consider other indicators, 
there is little support here for countercyclical measures that relate to property.  
Although the guidance gives deviations from the trend of property prices as a 
potential indicator to use in the decision to build-up the buffer, the view of BIS is that 
―deviations tend to narrow way ahead of the emergence of financial stains, suggesting 
that they would start releasing the buffer too early.‖ (BIS 2010; p9).     
However, there is strong support in the wider literature for varying capital 
requirements on the basis of changing asset prices as well as credit growth, written 
both before the crisis (see Goodhart 2005) and since (see for example Davis and 
Karim 2010). This approach has been taken in Spain and has been credited with 
lessening the impact of the financial crisis there (Barrell et al 2009)2.    
                                                 
2 However, at the time of writing, Spain along with Portugal are being increasingly identified as a 
potential case for a bailout following Greece and Ireland within the Eurozone. 
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There is discussion in the literature on countercyclical measures more directly related 
to property. Goodhart (2010) exemplifies this in his support for the use of 
countercyclical measures centred on loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) 
ratios.  However, he actually advocated the use of pro-cyclical mark-to-market 
mechanisms for the valuation of assets, perhaps because he saw the alternative as 
being a reversion to the (once common) use of historic accounting methods.  Initially 
there also seemed to be support for LTV/LTI based measures in the UK.  The Turner 
Review (2009) was the regulatory authority‘s report on what went wrong and what 
measures could be implemented to lessen the possibility of it happening again; a key 
suggestion was to vary LTV and LTI ratios over the property cycle so reducing the 
ratios when property prices are rising strongly and vice versa.  The study of bank 
lending on commercial property by Maxted and Porter (2010) showed that this risk 
mitigation approach was not one used by lenders during the period between 1998 and 
2007 as lenders‘ maximum LTVs in the UK market remained very stable at around 
80% LTV; they only fell in the post crisis era so enhancing the cycle rather than 
acting against it.  (See Figure 1).    In any event, a more recent discussion document 
from the UK regulator suggests that it is reluctant to engage in such direct product 
regulation, in the residential market at least (FSA 2010),  preferring to focus on 
measures to ensure loans are affordable.     
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Figure 1 – Maximum Loan to Market Value Lending Ratios for Prime and 
Secondary Offices – All Lenders 1999 to 2009.  (Source Maxted and Porter, 
2010) 
 
This discussion reveals some appetite for monitoring asset prices and related ratios as 
part of countercyclical measures, However, nowhere does this include a different 
approach to property valuation itself.  This is despite the fact that it does have a 
significant part to play in the bank lending process and in fuelling asset price bubbles.  
This role is discussed in the next section. 
4. The role of property valuations in the lending process 
Property valuations contribute to the bank lending process on a number of levels.  
First, where property is used as security for loans, they are used in individual lending 
decisions and to track the progress of loans.  At as macro level, they are an integral 
part of capital adequacy systems. Relevant to this are the two alternative approaches 
to minimum capital requirements within Basel 2 known as the standardised approach 
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and the internal ratings based (IRB) approach which have differing approaches to the 
risk weighting of real estate loans which centre on the valuation.  The reforms in 
Basel 3 leave these aspects unchanged.  
In the standardised approach, risk weightings are fixed.  Commercial loans attract a 
100% weighting but there are exceptions for well developed and long established 
markets which may attract a 50% weighting for elements of the loan below a 50% 
ratio of loan to Market Value (MV) or 60% of Mortgage Lending Value (MLV).  The 
IRB approach allows lenders to make their own internal assessment of risk by 
considering various risk drivers; these are probability of default, loss given default, 
exposure at default and maturity.  Under this approach it is possible for a loan on 
commercial real estate to attract a risk weighting as low as 30%.   
Within this framework, real estate that is acting as collateral for a loan must be valued 
by an independent valuer to identify its MV or MLV and risk weightings are affected 
by the LTV ratio of outstanding loans on these properties.  As Van Order (1990) 
noted, LTV acts as a buffer against risk and is a key indicator of the risk of default 
and the extent of loss in the event of a default.    
Panagopoulos and Vlamis (2008) remark that real estate lending and valuation are not 
well handled within Basel 2.  In particular, they criticize the lack of  attention paid to 
valuation methods.  However, valuation method is a means to answering particular 
valuation questions and these questions are posed by the different definitions of 
value.  Therefore it is the basis, not the method, that dictates the valuation result, 
within normal confines of valuation accuracy (RICS/IPD, 2009), and which should be 
the centre of attention.   These bases of value are well developed internationally and 
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are set out in both the international valuation standards (IVS, 2007) and within the 
RICS UK national standards. 3 4   
5. Bases of valuation in secured lending 
MV is an exchange price concept with no shelf life beyond the date of valuation.   It 
is perceived generally to be both observable and objective in that it can be related to 
actual transactions taking place in a market and the valuer is therefore a scorekeeper 
and not a market maker (Baum and Crosby, 2008). However, it has its critics in the 
context of secured lending.  Market values track the cycle and, as they are central to 
legitimising and sanctioning loans, and go hand in hand with the increased bank 
lending and inflated prices noted earlier.  This relationship was expounded by Borio 
et al (2001) and more recently by others such as Barrell et al, (2009).   Borio et al 
(2001) extended their concerns to include short term cash flow approaches and their 
                                                 
3 Market Value is the estimated amount for which an asset should exchange on the date of valuation 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's length transaction after proper marketing 
wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion. (RICS, 2008). 
 
4 The mortgage lending value shall mean the value of the property as determined by the valuer making 
a prudent assessment of the future marketability of the property by taking into account long-term 
sustainable aspects of the property, the normal and local market conditions, the current use and 
alternative appropriate uses of the property. Speculative elements should not be taken into account in 
the assessment of Mortgage Lending Value.  Mortgage Lending Value shall be documented in a 
transparent and clear manner.  (EMF, as set out in RICS, 2008) 
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tendency to promote pro-cyclicality.  Such disquiet is central to the current drive to 
find countercyclical measures that can be used to prevent a recurrence of the recent 
crisis. 
In this context it may seem that alternative valuation methods such as MLV have a 
role to play.  MLV differs from MV in that it is a concept aiming to provide a value 
that is stabilised through time.  Its roots are in mainland Europe; consequently the UK 
and some mainland European valuation traditions have clashed as markets globalise 
and more consistency of practice is sought (JLL, 2008).  MLV was described by 
Borio et al as being ―designed to produce more stable valuations‖ (2001: p36) 
because of its use of long term trends and discount rates. Similarly, Quentin (2009) 
advocated the use of MLV as a means of evening out the peaks and troughs of M V.  
Certainly, Lea et al (1997) believed that MLV has stabilised property cycles in 
Germany.   
However the definition and application of MLV has been criticised by Crosby et al 
(2000) as having no economic basis (it is not a value in exchange or in use) and being 
incapable of objective analysis due to the variety of different interpretations which 
can be applied to each element of the definition.  They suggested Investment Value 
(IV), a value in use concept, also defined in International Valuation Standards, as an 
alternative approach to MLV.  Although IV is, like MV, a snap shot value at the 
valuation date,  it is normally applied through the development of an expected cash 
flow discounted at a risk adjusted discount rate, which may vary through time with 
changes to expected cash flows and changes to the risk free rate and risk premium 
(see, for example, Baum and Crosby (2008) and RICS (2010)).  Lind (2005), while 
agreeing that MLV is too subjective also feels that IV suffers from the similar 
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problem.  He discusses another valuation approach for bank lending purposes which 
he termed ‗Reference Value‘ with the same aim of smoothing valuations through the 
cycles as in MLV with reference to historical data. However, it is not an established 
basis of valuation with an agreed definition within IVS so we do not model this 
approach to valuation within this paper but note the contribution of Lind (2003), Lind 
and Persson (1998) and Norlund (2008) to this debate.   
Crosby et al (ESRC 2004) found that the identification of exchange price (MV) was 
the dominant basis of valuation and that capitalisation rate comparable valuation was 
the major method adopted in bank lending valuations in the UK in the period before 
the financial crisis.  However, this study found that lenders frequently amended MV 
by asking valuers to incorporate assumptions reflecting less favourable 
circumstances.  These included assuming that let properties were vacant or they were 
in a different leasing or physical state; for example, assuming condition and lease 
expiries consistent with the end of the loan rather than the beginning.  MLV was 
found to be little used by UK lenders or valuers.  This is perhaps not surprising as the 
Red Book states that MV is the appropriate basis and should be used for all secured 
lending valuations (RICS, 2008, p89).  IV is not identified as an appropriate basis of 
valuation for lending purposes in International or UK valuation standards. 
6. Research questions 
The literature suggests that valuations have an important role in individual lending 
decisions and are central to risk management in capital adequacy systems.  It is also 
clear that while property or real estate is central to the financial crisis, and is therefore 
presumably relevant to crisis prevention in the future, current discussions on the 
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reform of banking by both BIS and the UK regulator appear to be ignoring real estate 
issues in general and property valuation in particular. 
The research question that arises is whether changing the basis of valuation could be 
used to help prevent any future crisis.  Although MV appears to be the worst possible 
pro-cyclical basis for bank lending purposes, it has survived three major property 
crashes in the UK since the early 1970s.  We therefore consider the practical 
application of the alternative models, applying them to a segmented model of the UK 
property market through the latest bubble/crash cycle (from the end of 2004 to the 
end of 2008).  The model uses aggregated Investment Property Databank and 
Investment Property Forum data on the office, retail and industrial markets to 
undertake simple annual re-valuations using MV, IV and MLV bases with appropriate 
application of methods of valuation for these bases.  A first objective of this research 
is therefore to identify the appropriate method and use of the data for each basis. 
7. The application and data requirements of the three bases of valuation 
The application of valuation bases and models in the UK is relatively well 
documented in basic academic and practitioner texts and surveys of practice.  Baum 
and Crosby (2008) provide a detailed analysis of the various approaches to MV and 
IV.  Ruchardt (2003) gives an equally detailed exposition of the application of MLV, 
albeit from a German perspective.  However, he suggests that this perspective is also 
shared across Europe with the European Mortgage Federation producing a number of 
reports concerning the application of the technique across Europe.   
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to set out anything other than the broad principles 
of the three different techniques in order to isolate the general modelling approach to 
valuation of each of them.   
There have been a number of surveys of UK practice of both the bases used and the 
application of methods.  Crosby (1991) and French (1996) illustrate that market value 
for investment properties is normally undertaken by capitalisation rate based 
comparative models in the UK and that cash flow based approaches are not often 
used.  Recent guidance notes produced by the RICS suggest that, where comparable 
evidence exists, the method adopted is still based on capitalisation rates (all risks 
yields) and that explicit cash flow is only used for IV or worth (RICS, 2010), 
normally within the context of an acquisition or sale.  
MV is the current market rent capitalised at a capitalisation rate based on an analysis 
of current market sales.  In order to track values through time it is only necessary to 
identify the capitalisation rate at the date of valuation and the level of rental value 
growth over the time since the previous valuation. 
IV is an explicit cash flow model and the major inputs are market rent, rental growth 
rate, target rate of return, holding period and exit capitalisation rate.  Even using these 
simple inputs and ignoring other issues such as lease events, the impact of 
depreciation and capital expenditure, it is a more complex model than the market 
valuation model and this may explain the charge of subjectivity which is often 
levelled at it.  We will address issues of subjectivity and valuation variation in our 
discussion after the modelling of the UK market before and after the financial crisis. 
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MLV is a less well documented approach and needs some more identification before 
modelling.  The latest EMF (2009) report reiterates the basic approach of MLV and 
the key issues to be addressed by the valuer:  
The future marketability and saleability of the property has to be assessed carefully 
and prudently. The underlying time perspective goes beyond the short term market 
and covers a long term period.  
As a principle, the long term sustainable aspects of the property such as the quality of 
the location, construction and allocation of surfaces must be taken into account. 
As far as the sustainable yield to be applied is concerned, the rental income must be 
calculated based on past and current long term market trends. Any uncertain 
elements of possible future yield increases should not be taken into account.  
The application of capitalisation rates is also based on long term market trends and 
excludes all short term expectations regarding the return on investment. 
The valuer must apply minimum depreciation rates for administration costs and 
capitalisation of rents.  
If the mortgage lending value is derived using comparison values or depreciated 
replacement costs, the sustainability of the comparative values needs to be taken into 
account through the application of appropriate discounts where necessary. 
The mortgage lending value is generally based on the current use of the property. The 
Mortgage Lending Value shall only be calculated on the basis of a better alternative 
use, under certain circumstances i.e. if there is a proven intention to renovate or 
change the use of the property.”  (EMF, 2009, Annex 3) 
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How these principles are to be achieved is less well articulated, although Ruchardt 
(2003) provides a number of rules based,worked examples showing that the rent used 
in the MLV calculation is based on actual current market transactions, with the 
proviso that rent must be sustainable.  Ruchardt (2003, p35) suggests that sustainable 
rents need not be crisis rents but would clearly be below maximum rents obtained “at 
the lowest point of market development”   They can be at the same level as market 
rents and Ruchardt (2003, p90) reiterates that current market transactions give a 
realistic and objective basis for sustainable rent.  However, IPF (2010) illustrates that 
sustainable rental value assessments in Frankfurt during the period 1997 to 2007 were 
smoothed compared to agent assessments for the same market.  Sustainable rents are 
also reduced for any natural vacancy which is thought to exist.  
For the modelling process it is assumed that current market rents will be used as the 
basis for the MLV calculation but we would expect some element of smoothing to be 
introduced if market rents showed a tendency to rise significantly in any particular 
year. 
The capitalisation rate choice is even more formulaic.  Ruchardt (2003, p104-105) 
sets out the principle that capitalisation rates are fixed by reference to past long term 
rates and that in Germany these rates are, for commercial property, in the region of 
6%-7% for commercial and 6.5%-8.5% for industrial/warehouse property.  However, 
the rates should be identified individually and therefore in this modelling process 
capitalisation rates will be derived from the long term data from the market in 
question, the UK.  Ruchardt (2003, p113-4) specifically identifies the UK as a place 
where deductions for operating expenses are not deducted from rents so valuers are 
18 
 
required by the German Mortgage Bank Act to add at least 15% to the capitalisation 
rate to compensate.   
There is also another requirement that the capitalisation rate used in the MLV should 
not be lower than one used in MV.  This would only become an issue in the UK 
market where capitalisation rates were 15% higher than trend. 
 The next section of this paper details the modelling process and the data used in the 
current study to understand the effect of having bank lending valuations carried out 
by either MLV or IV rather than by MV over the last cycle. 
8. The “value” of the UK property market 2004 to 2008 
A simple model of the three basic sectors of the UK property market from the end of 
2004 to the end of 2008 is set out below 
Market Value 
Market valuation in the UK is based on the simple capitalisation rate model: 
V0 =          RV
        
        K1     (1) 
 
When used in practice, capitalisation rates (k1) are usually estimated from analysis of 
transactions involving the sale of comparable assets rather than by estimating target 
rates of return and constant growth rates. The simple model assumes a property just 
let at its rental value (RV) on a full repairing and insuring lease by the tenant (i.e. the 
rental value estimate is also the net operating income (NOI)).  In the UK the normal 
rent revision period is 5 years but in the simple model annual rent reviews are 
assumed for the sake of calculating the market value at each annual valuation date.  
Capitalisation rates are assumed to be observed from the market place and the 
equivalent yield or capitalisation rate for office retail and industrial property is taken 
from the annual UK Investment Property Databank digest.  The NOI or RV is 
assumed to be #1 at the beginning of the period under observation (end of 2004) and 
g
NOI
V
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is then grown each year by the observed rental growth in that year, also from the IPD 
digest for the appropriate sector. The valuation at each period is the NOI or rental 
value at the valuation date divided by the cap rate for the appropriate time period.  
Table 1 sets out the information for the valuations at the appropriate valuation dates 
at the end of 2004 to the end of 2008. 
 
Table 1 - Rental Value and Capitalisation Rates UK Commercial and Industrial 
Property Market end 2004 to 2008 used in Market Value (source IPD).   
 Rental Value Capitalisation rate (IPD Equivalent 
Yield) 
 Office Retail Industrial Office Retail Industrial  
        
End of 
Year        
2004 1 1 1 7.09 6.01 7.66  
2005 1.026 1.038 1.011 6.32 5.46 6.88  
2006 1.104 1.066 1.023 5.45 5.03 6.21  
2007 1.208 1.087 1.040 6.18 5.681 6.87  
2008 1.162 1.089 1.040 8.29 7.76 9.35  
 
 The estimates of MV were then checked against the movement in capital values 
within the IPD index.  They are virtually identical with IPD capital growth for retail 
and industrial sectors (within 1.5% every year).  They overstate the office market 
increase during 2005 and 2006 by a combined total of 10% compared to the IPD 
annual index. 
 
Mortgage Lending Value 
The definition and application of MLV is more difficult to interpret as to how a 
valuation would be approached.  However, in principle the basic idea is to identify 
sustainable inputs.  As occupational markets were not particularly volatile during this 
period, market rent can act as a surrogate for sustainable rent.  The backward looking 
historical approach to capitalisation rates is used to introduce some form of 
objectivity to the valuation.  The capitalisation rate is therefore determined by 
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reference to an historic average as indicated below for the IV but, in accordance with 
Ruchardt (2003), 15% is added to the long term trends.  Table 2 sets out the data used 
in the MLV valuations and the model is as equation (1) but with the cap rate (k2) 
determined as above.  
V0 =          RV
        
        k2     (2) 
 
 
Table 2 - Rental Growth and Capitalisation Rates UK Commercial and Industrial 
Property Market – Mortgage Lending Value - end 2004 to 2008 (source IPD).   
 Rental value Capitalisation rate (IPD Equivalent Yield 
Average) 
 Office Retail Industrial Office Retail Industrial  
        
End of 
Year        
2004 1 1 1 8.32 7.63 9.96  
2005 1.026 1.038 1.011 8.24 7.55 9.84  
2006 1.104 1.066 1.023 8.14 7.45 9.70  
2007 1.208 1.087 1.040 8.06 7.38 9.60  
2008 1.162 1.089 1.040 8.07 7.40 9.59  
 
Investment Value 
The IV of each sector is based on a simple 5 year cash flow.  For rental value growth 
the model utilises the Investment Property Forum Consensus rental value growth 
forecasts of each sector for the five years ahead (g). (actually taken from the 
following February forecast as the closest to the valuation date)  This cash flow is 
discounted at a target rate of return (TR) based on the survey of target rates by DTZ 
within their Money into Property series (DTZ, annual).  The exit value is a 
combination of the actual rental growth forecast on the rent capitalised at an exit 
capitalisation rate.  This exit yield is based on the IPD equivalent yield series. Taking 
the average over the period 1981 (the date IPD first started measuring property 
g
NOI
V
21 
 
performance in the UK) to the valuation date. This is the same rate as was used in the 
MLV valuations (k2) before the 15% was added. All inputs were available at or 
around the date of valuation so no hindsight is involved.   
 
V0  =   RV (1- (1 + TR)-t) + RV (1 + g)t 
            TR    k2  (3) 
 
 
The additional inputs necessary for the IV are included in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Rental Growth forecasts and Target Rates UK Commercial and Industrial 
Property Market – Investment  Values - end 2004 to 2008 (source DTZ, IPD).   
 Rental value forecasts for the 
next 5 years  
(from Feb year plus 1) Target Rates - DTZ) 
 Office Retail Industrial Office Retail Industrial  
        
End of 
Year        
2004 3.5 1.9 1.9 8.5 7.7 8.5  
2005 4.6 1.5 1.8 8.60 7.20 9.10  
2006 4.1 1.8 1.9 8.90 8.80 9.40  
2007 1.4 1.4 1.2 8.80 6.60 11.70  
2008 -4.0 -2.0 -2.3 7.00 8.00 7.00  
 
The Target Rates from DTZ appear very variable in the last 2 years.  A longer term 
assessment of the risk premium above medium term bonds in the DTZ survey 
suggests that retail has a lower risk premium than offices and offices lower than 
industrial.  Using a fixed risk premium every year of 2.5% for retail, 3% for offices 
and 3.5% for industrial does appear to produce a less volatile profile although for 
every year and every sector except one; industrial in 2007, the difference in value is 
no more than 6%.  Following a significant increase and then decrease in the target 
rate reported for industrial in 2006 and 2007, there is a 17.5% difference between the 
IV using DTZ target rates and 3.5% above bonds in that year.  However, for the 
purposes of this exercise the more volatile DTZ outcomes are utilised. 
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Valuations of the UK office, retail and industrial markets 
The resulting valuations by each basis are set out Table 4 
Table 4- Market Value, Mortgage Lending Value and Investment Value of the UK 
Commercial and Industrial Property Market End 2004 to 2009.   
Market Rent £1 Beginning 2005. 
 MV Office MV Retail MV Industrial 
2005 14.0962 16.6437 13.0503 
2006 16.2250 19.0026 14.6969 
2007 20.2681 21.1790 16.4747 
2008 19.5398 19.1519 15.1273 
2009 14.0192 14.0282 11.1250 
     MLV Office MLV Retail MLV Industrial 
2005 12.0153 13.1005 10.0359 
2006 12.4432 13.7505 10.2758 
2007 13.2365 13.7871 10.4316 
2008 13.5707 13.8132 10.5870 
2009 11.9134 13.5365 10.4331 
     IV Office IV Retail IV Industrial 
2005 13.4311 13.9574 11.2736 
2006 14.3456 14.6954 11.1914 
2007 15.1436 14.4267 11.3354 
2008 15.2639 15.9704 10.3897 
2009 13.1343 13.3991 11.1491 
 
At the beginning of the analysis period, the difference between the valuations already 
suggests that MVs are significantly in front of the worth of these properties as 
evidenced by their IVs.  This difference is illustrated in Fig 2 and shows that offices 
are the least over-valued by this measure.  As the bubble progresses through 2005 and 
2006 offices continue to be the least over-valued sector with retail the most 
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overvalued and, by the beginning of 2007, retail is over-valued, along with the 
industrial/warehouse sector, by nearly 50%.  In the post 2007 crash era, property 
MVs fall back and this analysis suggests that by the end of 2008 the market had 
returned to a situation whereby MVs were close to IVs, indicating a correction but not 
an over-reaction.  This is also the conclusion from the use of IV at a Target Rate 
based on Bonds and fixed risk premium through time (See Figure 3). 
In all cases the MLV is lower than both MV and IV throughout the period.  At the 
peak of the market in early 2007, MV was around 75% to 80% higher than MLV 
undertaken using the model specified above. 
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Figure 2 : Difference between Market Value and Investment Value – UK End of Year 
2004 to 2008.  TR based on Survey Evidence.  Constructed by authors from source 
data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
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Figure 3 : Difference between Market Value and Investment Value – UK End of Year 
2004 to 2008.  TR based on Bonds plus a fixed risk premium.  Constructed by authors 
from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
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Figure 4 indicates the similarity between MLV and IV.  Although MLV is 
significantly lower than IV at around 25% - 30% the gap remains fairly consistent 
through time and does not show any significant widening as the bubble progresses.  
Both models therefore introduce a similar level of smoothing of the asset values 
compared to MV.  Using a fixed risk premium based IV again does not change this 
conclusion.  In fact it creates a more pronounced flat line difference between 2004 
and 2007 before indicating that IV falls closer to MLV in 2008 (See Figure 5).  But 
crucially, in the period before the crisis where most lending was taking place, there is 
no difference in the behaviour of the valuations compared to MV – they both fall 
away from MV at a similar rate as the bubble progresses. 
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Figure 4 : Difference between Mortgage Lending Value and Investment Value – UK 
End of Year 2004 to 2008.  TR based on Survey Evidence.  Constructed by authors 
from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
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Figure 5 : Difference between Mortgage Lending Value and Investment Value – UK 
End of Year 2004 to 2008.  TR based on Bonds plus a fixed risk premium.  
Constructed by authors from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to examine the role of valuations in the prevention of 
future banking crises.  Property has been identified at the root of the crisis but in the 
UK is not part of the discussion around future prevention.  However property 
valuation has a role in the capital adequacy framework. 
 This research addresses the issue of valuation concepts and bases at a time when 
concerns over the pro-cyclicality of current governance instruments are being 
expressed.  The literature on bubbles and crashes suggests investors need little 
encouragement to extend bull markets in the expectation that early exit would harm 
short term performance and therefore bank lending practices that encourage and feed 
those expectations must be, in some way, responsible for this behaviour.     
The regulatory authorities have identified 2 bases of valuation within capital 
adequacy requirements and these are Market Value and Mortgage Lending Value. 
Our previous survey work shows that MV dominated bank lending decision making 
at the individual asset level in the period before the financial crisis and there is also 
no doubt that MV tracks bubbles rather than acts against them. 
There is evidence that lenders in this period were aware of the limitations of MV for 
bank lending purposes.  MV was often tempered with various assumptions that 
showed lenders considering the longer term prospects of buildings, particularly those 
held as investments.  Overseas lenders in particular seemed to be attempting to amend 
the MV definition. These amendments included considering the state, age and leasing 
of the building at the end of the loan period, not the beginning.  So while the lenders 
obviously believed that a benchmark exchange value was what they needed, they did 
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appear to put some shelf life to the valuation through the time scale of the loan.  
However, they appeared not to have extended this to assessing the exchange price at 
the end of the loan or other future date (a future market value). They also did not 
attempt to use any form of Investment Value, the other different valuation concept 
defined within International Valuation Standards, so this also suggests they were not 
willing to forecast future values.  But the current MV with no amending assumptions 
was obviously not perceived to be perfect for the lending purpose.  MLV was used by 
a small minority of lenders but not enough to have any major impact on overall 
lending. 
Lenders did not appear to have used the other mechanisms at their disposal.  LTV 
ratios, which could have been adjusted to encourage countercyclical behaviour, were 
not reduced until after the financial crisis – counter cyclical arguments would suggest 
at precisely the wrong time after MVs had fallen from their cyclical peak in 2007.  
The current discussion around regulatory reform suggests that not only are property 
valuations not part of the proposed solutions, neither are counter-cyclical adjustments 
to LTV and LTI. 
Would the use of a different valuation regime have changed the nature of lending in 
the UK?  Both IV and MLV produce lower valuations but more importantly they do 
not react significantly to increasing asset prices caused by a changing relationship 
between income and capital asset prices.  In other words, assuming consistent LTV 
based lending during the bubble, the actual amounts of lending secured on 
commercial property to property would have reduced. Both bases react to increases in 
the rental markets although the ambiguities surrounding the definition and application 
of MLV make that aspect of value change more difficult to model.   
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MLV gives the lower valuations but this should not be the only criteria.  MLV is a 
routine rather than any form of objective economic appraisal and does not confirm to 
any known economic concept of value.  Both MV and IV conform to concepts of 
value in exchange and value in use.   
IV produces a counter cyclical value profile but suffers from the perception of 
subjectivity of inputs.  The level of valuation accuracy (valuation to sale price) and 
variation (valuation compared with valuation) is well documented in the UK and 
elsewhere but this is a measurement of variation around MV only.  There has been no 
attempt to measure valuation accuracy or variation in MLV and IV valuations.  Given 
the difficulties of identifying a price benchmark for an accuracy study, variation is the 
only realistic measure for MLV and IV.  Given the rules based routine of MLV, little 
variation may be expected but the ambiguities in much of the application may well 
introduce significant variation.  It would be interesting to see if the commonly held 
perception that more inputs would lead to more variable valuations is actually true for 
IV.  On the surface it would appear to be a major issue.  Baum (2000) found that 
investors generally use IV to inform investment decisions, it appears they would have 
been used in the market place during the bubble.  If they were being used in the 
decision making process, there must have also been some major manipulation of 
target rates, growth rates and exit capitalisation rates during 2005, 2006 and the early 
part of 2007.  For example, assuming exit yields at the same level of entry yields 
creates a situation whereby IV is within +/-10% of MV in all three sectors in the years 
2005, 2006 and 2007.  If investors were manipulating IV to support investment 
decisions, would the use of IV in bank lending valuations be similarly compromised? 
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The application of alternative bases can be utilised at a variety of levels.  The 
modelling in this paper was undertaken at a main property sector level to illustrate the 
concepts but the same modelling could be undertaken at various disaggregated 
segments of the property market down to the individual property level.  Banks could 
apply the alternative bases at these different levels to inform lending policy at the 
sector, area or other disaggregated level, not just at the individual property level. 
But which model should be applied regardless at which level.  First MV could be 
used as in the past.  It was the main basis for bank lending valuations in the last three 
UK property crashes and excessive bank lending to the property market has been 
implicated in each of these. Without reform of the either the valuation basis or the 
lending indicators applied to these bases, it is hard to see how the next debt-fuelled 
property crash can be avoided. Second, MLV could be adopted and applied however 
it can only operate at a cook book routine level – with the banks or the valuation 
professions producing a workshop manual with a required set of inputs based on 
consistent schedules of data and rule of thumb adjustments such as the 15% for 
―depreciation‖ as at present.  Third, IV could be the preferred solution.  It is a rational 
concept and approach but it is subject to the valuer‘s analysis of a range of inputs that 
could combine to produce significant valuation variation.  However, as indicated 
above, there is no evidence of what levels of variation exist between valuations 
undertaken for IV. 
The apparent difficulty of this choice may explain why MV has survived so long for 
the bank lending purpose despite being a major part of the problem.  The alternatives 
open up a number of practical questions of application but if it is a choice between a 
discredited approach, a workshop manual or a rational modelling of an uncertain 
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future, there seems little alternative to developing the latter into a major influence on 
the secured bank lending process for commercial investment property.  It seems that, 
given the current direction of travel, the changing regulatory regime does not even 
recognise the potential benefits of addressing these issues at a conceptual level, let 
alone addressing the practical difficulties of implementing any changes. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 – Maximum Loan to Market Value Lending Ratios for Prime and Secondary 
Offices – All Lenders 1999 to 2009.  (Source Maxted and Porter, 2010) 
Figure 2 : Difference between Market Value and Investment Value – UK End of Year 
2004 to 2008.  TR based on Survey Evidence.  Constructed by authors from source 
data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
Figure 3 : Difference between Market Value and Investment Value – UK End of Year 
2004 to 2008.  TR based on Bonds plus a fixed risk premium.  Constructed by authors 
from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
Figure 4 : Difference between Mortgage Lending Value and Investment Value – UK 
End of Year 2004 to 2008.  TR based on Survey Evidence.  Constructed by authors 
from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
Figure 5 : Difference between Mortgage Lending Value and Investment Value – UK 
End of Year 2004 to 2008.  TR based on Bonds plus a fixed risk premium.  
Constructed by authors from source data from IPD, IPF and DTZ. 
 
 
